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THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKABILITY OF REGULATED COMPETITION *
JOEL B. DiRAm

t AND IRWIN M. STELZER I

Public Law 15, which preserves to the states their right to regulate the busiuess
of insurance, represents an implicit decision, not only for state as against
federal control, but also for limited rather than full-bodied competition. It
represents an effort, the Authors argue, to foster a sclemw of regulation compatible with continued competition. In this Article they weigh the effectiveness
of state regulation and call for reforms to permit a greater extent of price
competition in. the insurance industry. Mr. Dirlain and Mr. Stelzer have
combined forces to produce articles in the field of antitrust in the past, and
each has written extensively about the operation,of the free enterprise system.
I. INTRODUCTION

The authors propose in this Article to appraise, on the basis of
the latest available evidence, the experience of the insurance industry
since the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. South-Eastern
UnderwritersAss'n. That decision touched off a chain of events which
resulted in more intensive state regulation of many aspects of the
insurance business I and partially exempted it from various provisions
of the antitrust laws. By re-examining' the mechanisms that were set
* The authors would like to thank Miss Lila Abramson for her valuable research
assistance.
t Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Connecticut.
A.B., 1936, Ph.D., 1947, Yale University.
t Vice President, Boni, Watkins, Jason & Co., New York. A.B., 1951, New
York University; M.A., 1952; Ph.D., 1954, Cornell University.
1. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). This reversal of the lower court ruling (see 51 F. Supp.
712, D. Ga. 1943) was accomplished without directly overruling the seventy-five year
old doctrine laid dow'n in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, noted that the Paul decision had only held that the
commerce clause does not deprive the states of the power to regulate and tax insurance.
Neither Paul nor any other case had required the Court to decide whether Congress
had the power to regulate insurance transactions stretching across state lines. Black
emphasized that "legal formulae designed to uphold state power cannot uncritically
be accepted as trustworthy guides to determine Congressional power under the Commerce Clause." 322 U.S. at 545.
2. Many states were already regulating various aspects-including rates--of the
industry. See WHITNEY, ANTITRUST PoLiciEs: AMEIcAx ExpmaUNCE IN TWENTY
INDUSTRIES (1958).
3. In an earlier study one of the authors concluded that, as a result of the SouthEaster; Underwriterscase, several undesirable practices were eliminated, others were
placed under state regulation, and consumers benefited from lower, more equitable
rates, a greater variety of rates, and more rational rate-making. See Stelzer, The
Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws: A Decade of Experience, 1955 INS. L.J.
137-52.
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up to supervise and regulate the operation of the insurance industry, it
is hoped that some constructive conclusions can be reached concerning
the adequacy of that regulation in meeting the needs of both the insuring companies and the insured public. Further, this analysis will, we
hope, be of interest to those concerned with the broader problems
raised by the substitution of formal administrative regulation for the
informal regulation provided by the competitive market place.

II. PUBLIC LAW 15
The fundamental purpose of Public Law 15 ' was stated to be the
preservation to the states of their right to regulate the business of inSince antitrust seemed to be the immediate expression of
surance.'
federal intervention, the statute provided that-except for acts of
boycott, intimidation or coercion-the antitrust laws would apply to
the business of insurance only in the absence of state regulation.!
Although Public Law 15 does not expressly declare that, to be insulated
from the thrust of federal power, the states must impose regulation
which is effective, 7 there can be no doubt that Congress and the
President s assumed that effective state regulation was necessary to
avoid federal intervention. Thus, Senator O'Mahoney, shortly after
are revived in
passage of the bill, noted that "the antitrust laws . .
all their vigor if state regulation fails," ' and the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division recently stated, "I do not
believe that an exemption exists for these activities [price-fixing, etc.]
4. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952). For legislative
history see House Legislative Calendar, 79th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., Committee on the
Judiciary, Jan. 29, 1946, No. 22, at 103. Congressional debate may be found in 91
CONG. REc. 478-88, 1085-93, 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945).
5. The preamble states: "That the Congress hereby declares that the coltinued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed
to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
States." 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952).
6. Section 3(a) states, "Until January 1, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, . . . and . . . the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act shall
not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof." Section 3(b)
adds, "Nothing contained in this Act shall render said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion or intimidation."
61 Stat. 448 (1947), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1952).
7. Section 2(b) states only that, upon expiration of the moratorium the antitrust
laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State Law." 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952).
8. In a statement issued upon signing the bill, March 10, 1945, President Roosevelt
said that antitrust laws after the moratorium would be "applicable in full . . . except
to the extent that the States have assumed the responsibility and are effectively performing that responsibility for the regulation. . . . Congress did not intend to permit
private price fixing." 13 PUBLIC PAPERS AN]D ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANo
RoosEvFLT 587 (Rosenman ed. 1950).
9. Speech reprinted in Government and the Insurance Business, 7 CAStALTY AND
SUETY J. 13 (1946).

THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

merely because a state has legislated, if it does not adequately enforce its
regulations." ' The key issue, therefore, is not whether the states have
passed regulatory legislation, 1 but whether state regulation has, in
Any appraisal of the effectiveness of state
practice, been effective.'
regulation must be made, however, with the realization that the
sanctioned continuance of state regulation involved an implicit decision,
not only for state as against federal control, but for a limited as against
a full-bodied type of competition. This decision for partial antitrust
exemption is, of course, not without precedent. Rail, air and water
carriers, for example, may file with their respective regulatory agencies
agreements concerning rates and other matters."3 These exemptions
do not, however, license these industries to impose cartel restraints on
their members. Railroads, for instance, may not agree to a pooling or
division of traffic and must be accorded "the free and unrestrained right
to take independent action" either before or after a Commission rate
determination. 4
The argument which has long been used to justify regulation of
the insurance industry, and which was marshalled to justify the partial
antitrust exemption of Public Law 15, is that the rate competition which
would result from a full-scale enforcement of the Sherman Act '5 is
undesirable. Because of certain unique characteristics of the business
of insurance, the argument continues, such competition would become
destructive. Some of these unique characteristics follow: 16
(1) A complicated financial contract makes it impossible for the
policyholder to determine value received.
10. Hansen, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws, The Insurance Broker-Age, Oct.
1957, p. 35.
11. For a review of legislation adopted see Stelzer, rupra note 3, at 146-48.
12. FTC v. National Cas. Co., 355 U.S. 867 (1958), sustained circuit court dismissals of Federal Trade Commission complaints against insurance advertising, on
the ground that the McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibited such intervention where states
had passed laws explicitly prohibiting unfair and deceptive insurance practices. The
Supreme Court refused to entertain an FTC contention that, even though the statutes
were not "mere pretense," unless they had crystallized into settled administrative procedure they were ineffective and hence inoperative as a bar to federal action. In so deciding, the Court held that while there might be a difference between "legislation"
and "regulation," nothing in the act supported the particular distinction which the
FTC attempted to draw. Cf. Kenney, Why This Jubilation at Suprene Court Decisim on A & H Inmirance?, 69 U.S. INvESToR 51 (1958).
13. See Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5b
(1952) ; 52 Stat. 1004, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 492 (1952).
14. 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1952). See also REPORT OF THE
ATr0R. Y GENERAL'S NATIoNAL Commirm To STUDY THE ANTruST LAWS Ch. VI

(1955).

15. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
16. For a classic statement of the characteristics of the insurance industry making
unlimited competition undesirable, see German Alliance ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S.
389 (1914). See also summary by Stelzer, supra note 3, at 141 and CowEE & Canran,
FEDaEwL REULATION OF INSURANCE 7, 72-73 (1949).
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(2) The insurer cannot know his costs in advance.
(3)

The insurer must maintain continued ability to meet contractual obligations. Consequently, the purchaser of an
insurance contract has a continuing interest in the solvency of
the obligor. But the insured pays a small amount (initially)
relative to what he may receive. Because of this low ratio
of premiums to possible liability, a company may be tempted
to cut rates drastically in order to increase the number of its
policyholders. As a consequence, solvency may be threatened.

(4) Reliable rate-making requires combining the experience of
many insurance carriers.
Our subsequent discussion will attempt to determine whether regulation of the insurance industry, 7 as conducted by the states since the
South-Eastern Underwriters case, has managed, in fact, to strike a
balance between undue repression of nascent competitive individualism
on the one hand and encouragement of cutthroat competition on the
other.

III.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE REGULATION

A. The Legislative Pattern
It should be noted that the McCarran Act, as Public Law 15 is
known, sets forth no precise standards for state regulation. For instance, the act does not even mention rating bureaus. It was left to
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, together with
the All-Industry Committee,"8 to draft model bills which would indicate
the proper future course for state regulation.
The stated purpose of the model rate regulatory laws was to
ensure that rates would not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory," and, at the same time, to authorize and regulate rating
9
bureaus without discouraging competition?'
In order to reconcile the
official recognition of the role of the rating bureaus with the avowed
17. The different legal and economic conditions under which the life insurance
industry operates have led the authors to exclude it from consideration in this Article.
18. For a list of members see Stelzer, supra note 3, at 147.
19. Proposed Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill; and Proposed Fire,
Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill, as cited in The Legislative Record,
Feb. 5, 1947 and Dec. 16, 1946, respectively: "Section 1-Purpose of Act. The purpose of this Act is to promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates to the
end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, and to
authorize and regulate co-operative action among insurers in rate making and in
other matters within the scope of this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended (1) to
prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or (2) to prohibit, or encourage except
to the extent necessary to accomplish the aforementioned purpose, uniformity in
insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or practices. This Act shall be liberally
interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this Section."
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purpose of preserving some measure of rate competition, independent
filings and deviations from bureau rates and classifications were expressly permitted °
While many of the model laws were passed in virtually all the
states 2 they were adopted with varying degrees of exactitude, so that
uniformity does not prevail. Further, since neither the model laws nor
the statutes adopted set out specific standards for determining whether
a rate is "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory," the
possibility, even the likelihood, exists that insurance commissioners and
state courts may arrive at nonuniform, even conflicting, interpretations
of the statutes, whether as applied to rates arrived at by the bureaus or
as applied to particular deviations from them.
Clearly, an examination of the functioning of regulation under the
new legislation is necessary to determine not only whether the principles of the model laws themselves have been upheld but whether the
sum total of this regulatory experience approaches the effective regulation envisaged by Public Law 15." While it would be of great assistance to have a detailed analysis of the policies of each state toward
competition, and toward rate and classification deviations, a more
limited survey can provide a basis for appraisal.
20. Proposed Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill, sup-a note
19, k7: "[A]ny insurer may make written application to the [commissioner] for
permission to file a deviation from the class rates, schedules, rating plans or rules....
The [commissioner] shall issue an order permitting the deviation for such insurer to
be filed if he finds it to be justified. ... "
Proposed Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill, supra note 19, § 7: "Every
member of or subscriber to a rating organization . . . may make application to the
[commissioner] for permission to file a uniform percentage decrease or increase to
be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system so filed for a kind of
insurance or for a class of insurance which is found by the [commissioner] to be a
proper rating unit . . . , or for a subdivision of a kind of insurance (1) comprised
of a group of manual classifications which is treated as a separate unit for rate making
purposes, or (2) for which separate expense provisions are included in the filings of
the rating organization."
21. As of November 19, 1957, 26 states had adopted the NAIC Rules Governing
Advertising of Accident and Sickness Insurance; 41 states and two territories had
enacted the State Fair Trade Practices Act; 45 states and three territories had
enacted the Uniform Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law; 42 states and
Hawaii had adopted the Unauthorized Insurers Service of Process Act. See NATIoNAL ASSOcIATION OF INSURANCE CoMMIssIoEms, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING
SuB-CommIr
REPORT B4-1 (1957) .
22. It is clear that one of the pressures for the adoption of state regulatory laws
was the threat of federal intervention, as is evidenced by the concluding section of the
Texas act to regulate unfair methods of competition in the insurance industry: "The
fact that the e7wactment of this Act will strengthen state regulation of the business
of insurance; that substantially the same Act has previously been enacted in thirtynine states, and that it is designed to prevent federal regulation and taxation of the
business of insurance creates an entergency and an imperative public necessity that
the Conetitutional Rule requiring bills to be read on three several days in each House
be suspended; and said Rule is hereby suspended and this Act shall take effect and
be in force from and after its passage and it is so enacted." (Emphasis added.) See
Tex. S. 191, An Act To Amend Article 21.21 of Chapter 21 of the Insurance Code,
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B. State Regulation in Practice
1. Restriction of Entry
One balkanizing, anti-competitive and apparently unintended
effect of Public Law 15 has been to enable various states to limit the
ability of "foreign," i.e., out-of-state, insurance companies to compete
for business with "domestic" companies. Thus, Public Law 15
provided justification for a South Carolina statute which levied a tax
of three per cent on the premiums written in the state by a "foreign"
insurance company. Prudential, a New Jersey corporation which was
licensed to do business in South Carolina, argued in the courts that as
a consequence of the South-Eastern Underwriters decision the taxing
power of the state was limited by the commerce clause, and that this tax
represented an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. Although granting that in the absence of the McCarran Act
the tax would be unconstitutional, and that all the business done by the
insurance company in South Carolina, and thereby affected by the tax,
was done "in" or as a part of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
held that the McCarran Act had removed any objections that might
be made against the tax under the commerce clause. The Court rejected
the argument that Congress lacked the constitutional power to authorize
state action that would otherwise be prohibited by the commerce
clause.23
In the years since this decision was handed down, many if not
all of the states have levied premium taxes on out-of-state companies.
The burdensome nature of these taxes is increased by the fact that they
are not uniform as to rate or rate base. Some states allow a deduction
for reinsurance paid, for example, whereas others allow a reduction for
2 4
reinsurance premiums received.
This ability of the McCarran Act to insulate such legislation from
attack on constitutional grounds must be counted against it in our
attempt to assess its over-all impact. There can be no economic justification for such a tax. States desiring to protect their citizens from
"foreign" companies domiciled in states where regulation is less
stringent can surely find more effective tools than what is, in effect, a
discriminatory protective tariff.
approved May 8, 1957 (Tzx. INs. CODE art. 21.21 (Supp. 1958) ). The extent to which
this motive outweighed a desire for effective regulation is the subject of psycho-rather
than economic-analysis. The impact of state regulation, however, is susceptible to
analysis with the economist's tools, and it is to that which we direct ourselves.
23. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
24. MEHR & CA.MMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 836 (1957).
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2. Rating Bureaus and Deviations
Competition in insurance, as in all types of businesses, may take
three forms: (1) service, (2) product (policy), and (3) price (premium
rates). Conceding the existence, in vigorous degree, of service competition, and not having conducted the elaborate and detailed study of
policy provisions necessary to reach significant conclusions concerning
the extent of competition in liberalization of policy forms, we confine
ourselves here to an assessment of price competition. The paramount
problem is to discover the impact on price competition of state laws
and their administration; the task is to determine whether, contrary to
the directives of the statutes, competition has been discouraged. We
hasten to add that it is not at all clear that the statutes were intended to
encourage competition; they are, rather, elusively vague, explicitly
prohibiting neither competition nor rate uniformity."5
The extent of price competition in the insurance industry may, for
instant purposes, be inferred in large measure from data on trends in
the number of independent' filings and/or deviations. Under the
provisions of most state laws, rating bureaus are required to file all
rates and forms with the proper state authorities. After a stipulated
waiting period, these rates become effective unless found to be inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory. Individual companies
may make independent filings-an insurer is not required to become
either a member of, or a subscriber to, a rating bureau-or may file
deviations, which are to be approved if they meet the same standards
of adequacy, etc., required of bureau rates. 6 The model bills further
permitted individual companies to adopt individual systems of expense
allocation."
The extent and intensity of intercompany rate competition in the
various states is a function of several factors: (1) the number of
insurance companies that desire to determine their own rates, (2) the
provisions of the particular state statutes, (3) the regulations and
orders of the insurance commissioner issued pursuant to his interpretation of the statutes, (4) the courts' interpretation of the statutes, and
(5) the extent and degree of the bureaus' opposition to such independent
action.
25. Cf. note 19 supra.
26. Stelzer, supra note 3, at 147.
27. Proposed Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill, supra note 19, § 3(a) (2)
and Proposed Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill, supra note 19,
§ 3(a) (3). See also Kulp, The Rate Making Process in Property and Casualty
Insurance-Goals,Techniques, and Limits, 15 LAW & CoNT M,. PRoa. 513 (1950);
Murphy, Time Runs Out, 8 CASUALTY AND SUm, J. 51 (1947).
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Data now available indicate an increasing tendency in several states
to break away from rating bureau domination. In response to a
questionnaire mailed by one of the authors to the state insurance commissioners early in 1955, twenty of the twenty-three respondents providing usable answers indicated that they discerned no tendency for the
number of independent rate filings (or deviations) to decline since the
passage in their states of laws approximating the model rate regulatory
bills. 2 In an attempt to elicit further and more current information on
this point, the authors recently circulated another questionnaire to the
commissioners. Although response was far from complete, the results
are significant. In answer to a question regarding the trend of individual rate filings since 1954, thirteen respondents noted an increase
in independent filings and deviations, and six reported no change. (One
respondent reported increased independent filings in the casualty and
fire fields, and a decrease in the number of such filings in the inland
insurance line.)
That the provisions of the statutes and the attitude of the insurance
commissioners are of the utmost importance in determining the degree
of competition in the industry cannot be doubted. Nor can wide
differences in philosophies and policies be denied. Generally, three
fairly distinct approaches are discernible: an attempt to maximize and
widen the scope of permissible competition, within a framework of
regulation; an attempt to limit rate competition to some minimal
amount; an attempt to impose clear-cut utility-type rate regulation, with
the state commission promulgating rates and permitting no deviation.
New Jersey apparently provides an example of the first type of
approach. Its insurance commissioner recently stated-in the course
of approving a request of the Merchants Indemnity Corporation of
New York for permission to write fire and extended coverage at
fifteen per cent below the rates of the Fire Insurance Rating Bureauthat, in his view, "the entire philosophy of the rating laws leans in
favor of price competition in this State." 29
In other states, the emphasis on uniformity of rates and policies
outweighs any desire to stimulate competition. Thus, the insurance
department of Kentucky has sponsored three bills designed to restrict
filings of deviations; the bills have met with bitter opposition from the
independent companies.
"The bills in question would . . . authorize [the commissioner] to adopt uniform forms for any kind of insurance;
prevent a company from filing rate schedules or rating plans made
28. Stelzer, supra note 3, at 151.
29. Journal of Commerce, Jan. 10, 1958, p. 4.
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by a rating organization of which the company is not a member
or subscriber; and prohibit companies .

.

. from filing rates

made by another insurer." "
Commissioner Thurman stated that the insurance department needs
ample authority to control forms and rates or there would be no
intelligent way to find out whether premiums are excessive or inadequate. He further pointed out that a standard policy for fire insurance
has been adopted in most states, and that several states, including
Massachusetts, Texas and Virginia, have adopted a standard automobile
31

policy.

Finally, Texas provides an example of state imposed rate-setting.
Not only has that state adopted a standard automobile policy, but the
legislature has given the Board of Insurance Commissioners exclusive
power to promulgate and fix reasonable and adequate automobile
insurance rates. Companies may write fire insurance at lower than
promulgated rates upon a showing that the resulting premiums are
adequate, and that the reduced rates apply equally to all risks of the same
character in the same community.' For casualty insurance, the board
can make or approve premium rating plans designed to encourage the
prevention of accidents, recognize the peculiar hazards of individual
risks, and give due consideration to interstate as well as intrastate
experience.3" In addition to this broad and general delegation of
power, it is instructive to note that, for casualty insurance, the Texas
statutes contain no section on deviations.

"Texas . . . has a single

rating law for the fixing of casualty insurance rates. It does not permit
the fixing of casualty rates on a flexible basis." 3In addition to setting rates on automobile and casualty insurance,
it appears that the Texas board also fixes rates on credit insurance.
The Texas Consumers Credit Insurers Association has objected to the
action of the Board of Insurance, and has charged that the setting of
maximum rates is arbitrary, that there is no statutory authority for
limiting types of coverage to the four forms prescribed by the board,
and that the fixing of maximum commissions is a "new and nebulous
field" for the board.' Regardless of the validity of these objections,
30. The National Underwriter, March 7, 1958, p. 4 (fire and casualty ed.).
31. Id. at 29.
32. See 1 NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERwRrrERS, COMMITTEE ON LAWS,
COMPILATION OF RATE REGULATORY LAWS, citing Tex. Rating Laws, ch. 5, art. 5.26;
MEIR & CAMMACK, op. cit. supra note 24, at 822-23.
33. Texas Laws 1953, ch. 30, reproduced in 2 NATIONAL BOARU OF FIR UNDERwRrrERs, Cosrrrms ON LAWs, COMPILATION OF RATE REGULATORY LAWS.

34. Secrest Toward a Flexible Future-ThePolicyholder's Stake, in

PROCEEDINGS,

13TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS
26 (Chicago 1957). (Hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS.)

35. Journal of Commerce, Feb. 20, 1958, p. 5, col. 3.
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it is clear that regulation in Texas has gone beyond the mere approval
or disapproval by the board of the practices, schedules and rates of the
insurance companies.
Because Texas-type regulation has-fortunately, in our viewnot become widespread, we shall confine our attention to those forces
and policies which affect the breadth of the area within which competition, i.e., independence and deviation, is permitted to operate.
In many states substantial roadblocks have been placed in the path
of deviators (or more accurately, "would-be" deviators) by the
activities of the rating bureaus. The model laws provided for the
intervention of the bureaus in opposition to independent filing "I and
the bureaus have certainly taken full advantage of that provision. The
long harassment by the bureaus of the Insurance Company of North
America is a case in point. A recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Arizona,17 relating to the right of partial subscribership, is pertinent here as an illustration of an instance in which rating bureaus
and insurance commissioners have attempted-in this case unsuccessfully-to enforce rate uniformity in the insurance industry.
The right of partial subscribership, guaranteed in the model bills,
is important to a company that has sufficient loss experience on some
types of insurance to sustain an independent filing but does not have the
necessary data on all types of insurance to make the services of the
bureau completely unnecessary to it. Without the right of partial
subscribership, a company to whom some of the information collected
by the bureau is indispensable must either use bureau rates on all
types of insurance, or simply file deviations from some of those rates.
As many states require deviations to be refiled each year, the deviation
procedure is, at the least, cumbersome. Hence, partial subscribership is
a right important to companies driving toward more independent rate
structures.
The facts of the Arizona case were as follows. The North
American Companies notified the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau of the
termination of their subscribership to the rating services of that bureau
for "dwelling classes"; the notice of termination stated that the insurance companies desired, however, to retain subscribership for the
remaining services of PFRB. The bureau, after determining that its
by-laws and constitution would not allow it to take disciplinary measures
against the companies, amended its constitution to severely limit the
36. Proposed Fire, Marine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill, supra note 19,

§ 5 (d) ; Proposed Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill, suPra note 19, § 5 (d).

37. Pacific Fire Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 83 Ariz. 369, 321

P.2d 1030 (1958).
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right of partial subscribership. This rule 38 was approved by the
director of insurance. The trial court held for the rating bureau, but
the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed that decision and stated that
rule vii "obviously precludes freedom of rate competition that results
from partial subscribership. While the director may, under the statute,
approve reasonable rules and regulations he cannot make or approve a
rule, as here, that would conflict with the true meaning of the statute." "
That it took a long legal battle to win a point which the model
laws apparently made obvious cannot be ignored, and since most states
require annual rejustification of deviations, such struggles over independent filings become even more important. Nevertheless, in this
case at any rate, the battle was decided in favor of an expansion of the
area of permitted rate rivalry.
Another problem facing potential deviators stems from the fact,
cited above," that the statutes do not set out specific standards by which
to determine whether or not a rate is "excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory." One of the problems intertwined with this lack of a
clear standard is: On the basis of what statistics should such a judgment of reasonableness of rates be made? This problem appears to
arise only in connection with deviations and independent filings, for the
approval (or disapproval) of bureau rates is predicated on the loss and
expense experience data collected by the bureau from its members and
subscribers. But in the case of individual filings, the insurance commissioner is faced with a dilemma. Should he place primary reliance
on the loss experience of the insurer seeking approval of his individual
filing? Should he place primary emphasis on the loss experience of all
companies operating in the state? Those operating outside the state?
Or should a deviation or independent filing only be allowed on the
basis of a difference in expense? The problems of the insurance commissioners are further complicated by the classification of risks, for
the commissioners are charged with ensuring that there shall be no
discrimination-that is, the same rates must be charged for identical
38. Rule VIL as cited in the opinion, supra note 37, at 372, 321 P.2d at 1032:
"1. Partial services for a particular State or States shall be available to a subscriber
. . . in the following cases only: (a) Where the subscriber limits its writings in
the State or States covered by the application to the kind of insurance, subdivision,
or class of risk, or the part or combination thereof, for which such partial services
are requested. (b) Where the subscriber desires to utilize the services of the Bureau
in a particular State or States for all kinds of insurance and subdivisions or classes of
risk for which the Bureau promulgates rates and classifications except in a limited

specialty field or fields designated in the application for partial subscribership and

approved by the Governing Committee...
39. Pacific Fire Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 83 Ariz. 369,

375, 321 P2d 1030, 1034 (1958).
40. See text at p. 203 supra.
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risks. The practices in the states regarding justification of deviations
and independent filings have varied widely. A few examples will serve
to underscore this diversity.
At the end of 1957, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld an
order of the State Corporation Commission forbidding Allstate Insurance Company to subdivide automobile collision classes beyond the
subdivisions approved by the commission for the Virginia Insurance
Rating Bureau.4 Allstate held that its own experience indicated that
cars used for pleasure driving were less likely to be involved in accidents than were cars used daily for business. The rating bureau,
however, did not employ any such sub-grouping in its classification
and rate schedules. The commission denied Allstate's collision deviation, based on this sub-classification, on the grounds that all companies
should be required to use the same general classification, and that
Allstate's plan was unsound as it was based only on its own experience.
Logical questions to ask in regard to this decision are: As the rating bureau did not use this sub-classification, where and how was
Allstate to obtain data to support its case if its own experience was
insufficient proof? Why was its own experience an unsound basis for
the sub-classification sought? Was it unsound solely because it differed
from the experience of rating bureau members?
From the point of view of public interest, it should be pointed out
that if there was or is a significant difference in the loss experience of
collision insurance, as Allstate contended,. depending on whether the
automobile was operated for business or pleasure, then the cost of
collisions is being borne disproportionately by the automobile operators
who fall into the classification of those less prone to accidents.
An application by the Insurance Company of North America for
a ten per cent deviation from filed fire insurance rates in Virginia met
a similar fate.4 In this case, however, the basis for the dismissal was
the -fact that the company's expenses exceeded the expenses permitted
by the commission's formula for a deviation of ten per cent; and the
commission would not permit the company to absorb the difference
by accepting a profit rate below the five per cent required by the formula.
In sharp contrast to the Virginia commission's policy on deviation
justification is the policy adopted by the Ohio insurance department.
In determining whether or not a rate deviation is justified, the Ohio
41. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 434, 100 S.E.2d 31 (1957),
discussed in The National Underwriter, Nov. 7, 1957, p. 39 (fire and casualty ed.).
42. Application of Insurance Co. of No. America and Phila. Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. for a Devisation of the Rates of the Va. Ins. Rating Bureau for Fire and Extended Coverage No. 13556 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n, Oct. 4, 1957).
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department recognizes loss experience in the following order of
importance: 4
(1) Ohio loss experience of the insurer;
(2) Ohio loss experience of other insurers or rating bureaus; and
(3) Loss experience of the insurer or other insurers or rating
bureaus outside the State.
Thus, primary importance is attached to the experience of the
particular insurance company filing the new rate. In addition, it is
significant to note that the regulations of the Ohio Department of Insurance contain specific sections informing the insurance companies of
the procedures to follow in filing deviations as to rules, coverages and
forms.4
Something of a middle ground is occupied by the State of North
Carolina. There, the insurance commissioner recently allowed Allstate
to begin deviating fifteen per cent on fire and extended coverage; the
deviation was justified on the basis of the company's record of expense
saving. However, Allstate's requests for permission to deviate from the
policy forms and manual rules were denied, the commissioner stating
that North Carolina's statutes do not provide for such deviation.4
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing facts and analysis make possible the following
conclusions and recommendations.'
First, there seems to be little doubt that the related practices of
independent filings and of deviations from bureau rates are becoming
increasingly important. The responses to our questionnaire clearly
43. OHio DEmT OF INS., RATING SEcTIoN, GEN. BuLL. No. 26, FILING REQUIREmNTS-RATES, RULES AND COVERAGES § II, at 8 (Jan. 17, 1958).
44. Id. at 9, 10.
45. Journal of Commerce, Nov. 19, 1957, p. 8, col. 2.
46. The perfunctory nature of the annual reports of the commissioners and the
fact that their decisions are not collected by a reporting service, nor even, in most
instances, made available even in mimeographed form, has made it difficult to achieve
complete coverage. The Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary is currently investigating the effectiveness of state regulation under Public Law 15. See remarks of Senator Kefauver, 104 CoNG. REc. 1491
(1958), and speech of Donald McHugh as reported in N.Y. Times, May 7, 1958,
p. 58, col. 1. Hearings on airline insurance completed in the summer of 1958 indicated,
according to Senator O'Mahoney, that "certain segments of the insurance business
operate in a supervisory vacuum." He thereupon turned over to the Antitrust Division
the accumulated data. The National Underwriter, Oct. 11, 1958, p. 1. In October
1958, the committee's staff sent a questionnaire, the first of a series, to the state
commissioners, calling for detailed information on their staff and departmental organization, licensing and examination policies and procedures, and any actions taken against
restraints of trade. The Eastern Underwriter, Oct. 17, 1958, p. 5. Although the
inquiry may, as it proceeds, provide additional proof that regulation by fifty-one
commissioners, many with inadequate staffs, results in perfunctory, inflexible and
inconsistent rate review, its results are unlikely to require substantial modification of
our conclusions regarding treatment of deviations and independent filings.
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indicate this to be the case, and business journals provide corroborative
evidence. 7 There can be no denying, of course, that the path of the
independent or the deviator is not any easy one. An executive of one
company has described the experience of independent companies in the
following picturesque terms: "The company finds that the rating law in
some states is not a road or a highway, but a winding cowpath lined
with a forest of pressures and paved with the chuckholes of discouragement, stifling imagination, vision, logic and common sense." 48
A second conclusion which can be drawn from our study is that
there is considerable interstate variation in treatment of deviations
and independent filings.49 In this area, with the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners or some industry group as the instrument,
a drive towards greater uniformity seems in order. It is to be hoped
that the NAIC will reach a determination, using standards as liberal
as possible consonant with safety, regarding the extent to which individual company experience is acceptable in support of a deviation.
Where such single firm data do not suffice-and it is our view that
statistical techniques in the areas of sampling, etc., are now sufficiently
refined to permit of a fairly precise determination of the reliability of
such data-bureaus should be compelled to provide, at reasonable fees,
data for any sub-classification which a company contends is worthy of
consideration. The commissioner might, of course, decide that such
a sub-group is not a useful one for purposes of rate-making, but such a
decision will at least have been based on something more than whim
or inertia. This procedure may, we admit, require an improvementqualitative and quantitative-in the staffs of the state commissions.
Such, however, is the price of effective regulation.
A third conclusion which one can draw from the foregoing review
is that the path of the deviator is not only difficult, but unnecessarily
so.5° Measures to smooth that path should be given every consideration
47. See, e.g., Price Competition in Fire Insurance, Bus. Week, May 28, 1949,
p. 24.
48. Edward S. McMahon, Vice President, Wabash Fire and Casualty Co., PROCE DINGS at 110; see Kenney, Rate Deviatior Becomes Whipping Boy of Reactionaries in, Insurance Industry, 58 U.S. INVEST R 23 (1957).
49. There is, of course, wide variation also in the vigor and intensity with which
state commissioners review bureau rates. The Wisconsin commissioner, for instance,
on assuming office in November 1955, after an extensive review of fire insurance rates
submitted by the Wisconsin bureau, disapproved them all and set a maximum 2.5%
profit factor, cutting the suggested National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
profit in half. This action was exceptional. See Kenney, Insurance Commnssioners
Had Better Heed Wisconsin Supreme Court Decisiom, 69 U.S. INVESTOR 35 (1958).

50. The attitude of the industry toward deviation was indicated by the reaction
of Albert J. Smith, President of U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., one of two groups
writing hull and liability insurance for airlines, at hearings before the O'Mahoney
subcommittee (see note 46 srupra). According to Mr. Smith, competition was not only
a "rat race," it also tended to be "stupid and vicious." See Kenney, Senate Subcommittee HearingsPoint up Valuable Lesson to Insuranwe Industry, 69 U.S. INVESTOR 31,
35 (1958).
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-- within the framework of regulation based on statistically supported
rate filings. Of extreme importance would be the adoption of some
approach which would eliminate the necessity of annual justification of
deviations from bureau rates. If a deviation is based on a time period
long enough to establish the typical nature of the data on which the
deviation is based, subsequent annual rejustification would seem
unnecessary.
A fourth conclusion can be adduced from the above-cited information concerning the current functioning of the insurance regulatory
process. One would expect that the increased pressure on insurers to
justify their rates to state authorities would result in an improved rate
structure. Such, in fact, seems to be the case. Improved classifications
of fire occupancy hazards, uniform classification of expenses, formulae
for adjusting rates more equitably on a class-by-class basis, and experiV '
ence rating plans for multiple-location risks have all been introduced.
More specifically, there are now 110 classes of fire risks as compared
with twenty-six before 1944; most companies now tend to allocate
expenses to the class of risk for which the costs are incurred, whereas
no detailed or uniform breakdown of expense figures was compiled
before 1949; and the recommended maximum permissible fire underwriting profit adopted at the Commissioners' convention has been
reduced from eight per cent to six per cent. 2
Finally, the experience of well over a decade with completely rewritten and revised state regulation of insurance suggests certain
broader hypotheses regarding the use of conditional and partial exemptions from the antitrust laws. In the first place, given both the indifference with which state regulatory policy had viewed monopolistic
rate-fixing prior to 1944 and the clearly interstate nature of the business,
there was ample justification for the Department of Justice to assert
jurisdiction over the industry. At this point, two alternative courses
of action were open. The industry could have been policed by the
Antitrust Division, with rating bureaus eventually reduced to an informational function; this would undoubtedly have sufficed to give the
prevailing system of state rate regulation its quietus. Rates might
then have been set by some variety of price leadership, with an informal,
more or less precise, industry formula designed to fall short of
vulnerable conscious parallelism."
Price competition would have
51. Marryott, Mutual Izmrance Under Rate Regulation, 15 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 540, 54647 (1950).
52. WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 2.
53. See DnuLA & KAHN, FAIR COmPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTImUST POLICY 66-67, 126-29 (1954) ; REPORT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 36-42.
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been freer than before, but Congress apparently felt that a threat to
private and public welfare would still lurk in the potential-faint though
it would be-of unrestrained price competition. Hence the second
alternative appeared the more reasonable: to strengthen state regulation,
infusing it with greater sensitivity to the degree of competition that is
necessary to prevent exploitation, while at the same time reserving
partial jurisdiction to federal antitrust. Accepting as reasonable the
premise that completely unfettered competition in fire, casualty, and
surety insurance rate-making is economically undesirable, the compromise embodied in Public Law 15 is defensible as a program. This
is not to deny the existence of clear-cut support for the contention that
regulation, as it has been imposed, has tended to make deviation more
difficult than it would be were there no regulation. But unregulated
competition in the sale of insurance is not one of the alternatives open
to us. For better or worse, by state, or perhaps in the future by federal
agencies, 4 some form of regulation is here to stay."' This situation
antedated Public Law 15 and would survive its repeal.
Nor does it seem to us that espousal of a series of modifications of
the current regulatory procedures-modifications designed to facilitate
deviation and independent filings-is inconsistent with the position that
unrestrained competition would be unworkable in the lines of insurance
here under discussion. An increase in statistically supported nonbureau filings is quite a different thing from unfettered competitive
rate-making of the type called for by the Sherman Act. The requirement that companies desiring to meet the lower rates of competitors
must also statistically support their reductions ensures, given judicious
regulation, that rate-cutting will not reach ruinous proportions. Only
by cutting costs or improving experience could a company meet lower
rates of a competitor; failing that, it would have to content itself with
attempting to provide superior service.
Not to be overlooked in any assessment of the adequacy of the
present system of regulation in this industry is the fact that antitrust
exemption is only partial. As we pointed out earlier, acts of boycott,
intimidation and coercion may still be prosecuted under the provisions
of the Sherman Act. All indications are that the Department of
Justice is moving vigorously in this area. A consent judgment has
54. For an interesting discussion of the likelihood of federal regulation see Kim-

BALL & BoYcE, THE ADEQUACY OF STATE INSUP-A.NCE RATE REGULATION: THE
MCCARRAw-FERGUSON Acr IN HISTORICAL PERsPECrE, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 545, 576-78

(1958).
55. One attorney, writing in a somewhat different connection, has stated, "It is
useless for those who deplore the growth in the number and authority of administrative
bodies to wring their hands over a fait accompli." Miller, Administrative Law: Must

the Angels Weep?, 62 DIcx. L. Rnv. 205, 214-15 (1958).
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been obtained to put a halt to sales of funeral merchandise; " and
successful suits have been brought against boycotting practices of
agents' associationsF 7 There can be little doubt that the Justice Department intends to continue its efforts along these lines 5 8 Significantly,
overt industry support and enforcement of restrictive rules adopted by
brokers' associations have been eliminated. 9
A lesson of the McCarran Act seems to be, therefore, that if antitrust exemptions are to be made available there must be provision for
the Department of Justice to move when the regulatory authorities are
indifferent to the basic requirements for competition."O True, this does
not insure continuous supervision of the regulators, but this is too
much to ask in our society. The continued threat of possible repeal of
the McCarran Act, and of possible antitrust action under it, seem to
have sufficed to produce a slow but discernible shift in the industry
toward more flexible and independent pricing, and away from a series
of undesirable trade practices.
56. United States v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., Civil 7719-S, D. Ala., June 29,
1954.
57. United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.), aff'd
per curiam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957) ; cf. United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684
(N.D. Ohio 1956). For a discussion of some of the restrictive rules used by agents'
groups before the South-Eastern Underwriters Association decisions see Stelzer, supra
note 3, at 149; 1948 Nmv YORK STATE JOINT LE_ isLATIvE CoMMITaE ON INSURANCE
RATES AND REGULATIONS REPORT 19-20; Butler, Activities of Agents Under the
McCarram Act, 15 LAW & CONTEmp. PROB. 568, 571 (1950).

58. Address by Victor R. Hansen, "Antitrust and Regulation Problems in Insurance," delivered before the University of Arizona Program on Insurance Regulation,
Tucson, Ariz., Jan. 21, 1958.
59. In March 1950 the National Association of Insurance Agents notified its
branches that it would no longer aid in the enforcement of these rules. See Butler,
supra note 57.

60. But cf. von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regidated Industries: The
Doctrine of Primry Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REv. 929, especially 965-66 (1954).

